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OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
THE PURPOSE, OPERATION AND EFFECT OF THE EXPORT
EXEMPTION PROVISIONS OF THE COMBINES INVESTIGA-
TION ACT. (SECTION 32(4) and (5)).
The export exemption provisions, section 32(4) and (5) of the
Combines Investigation Act resulted from political, economic and legal
circumstances which must be delineated in order to understand the
intended operation of the provisions. This purpose vill be accom-
plished by stating the problem which arises from the export exemption
provision, outlining the historical reasons for its enactment, examining
its operation, and comparing its content briefly with the United States
Webb-Pomerene Act.
(a) Problem
The export exemption provisions permit Canadian firms to co-
operate for the promotion of their exports. The provisions state
generally that the court shall not convict the accused if the concerted
arrangement relates only to the export of articles from Canada, pro-
viding the arrangement does not result in restraint on any exporter
not a member of the arrangement, or in a lessening of competition
unduly in relation to an article in the domestic market.'
Proponents, on the one hand, would state that as Canada is
necessarily one of the largest trading nations in the world, we must
keep abreast of the mid-twentieth century economy and recognize that
it is only by some concerted arrangement that Canadian industries
faced by foreign cartelization, as exemplified by the European and
Japanese giants, can obtain the larger production runs necessary for
competitively priced products; consequently the export exemption
provisions are a recognition of economic reality.2 They might state,
too, that the export amendment is also a statutory articulation of
implicit law, and taken by itself, could be regarded as a contribution
to increased certainty in the anti-combines policy.3
Critics, on the other hand, would state that the export exemption
in subsection (4) of section 32 is so restricted by the qualifications
of subsection (5) that it renders the former virtually useless except
as a source of future litigation. They contend that the amendment
has weakened the general attitude of the business community to the
legislation 4 (through the probable effect on the domestic market) and
replaced the former uncertainty with a certainty, which has resulted
in a weakening of the entire legislation. 5
In the middle, are those who would assert that in the past there
have been no prosecutions of combinations entered into for export
1 Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 314 as am. by 1953.4, c. 51
and 1960, c. 45, s. 32(4) and (5). Note: Appendix "A" of this article.
2 H. of C. Debates, 1960, vol. VII, 6974.
3 Brecher, Combines and Competition: A Be-appraisal of Canadian Public
Policy (1960), 38 Can. Bar Rev. 523, 592.
4 H. of C. Debates, 1960, vol. VII, 7361.
5 Brecher, supra, footnote 3, at pp. 592-3.
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purposes; thus an export exemption provision is unwarranted in
light of history. They also point out that the general test of illegality
found in section 32(1) is sufficient to cover export combinations. Or,
in the alternative, assuming clarity and certainty are desired, ad hoe
exemptions should be permitted when circumstances indicate that
export trade would in fact be promoted by allowing co-operation.
6
(b) Development
In the House of Commons in 1960, the Hon. Davey Fulton, the
then Minister of Justice, introduced amendments to the Combines
Investigation Act.7 After stating the policy of the Conservative
government which prompted the amendments, Mr. Fulton explained
what the bill sought to accomplish.8
First it is designed to improve the existing provisions of the legislation
by way of clarification and consolidation, and second, it is designed to
bring the law in important particulars into line with the twentieth century
developments and to adapt it to the problems and situations of the twen-
tieth century economy.9
After the third reading, assent was given to the export exemp-
tion provisions which are now found in sections 32(4) and (5) of
the Act. The Minister explained the proposal in part as follows:' 0
First, whether we like it or not, in international trade there is a
tendency toward association or cartelization, and whether we like it or
not this is the situation within which our industry must compete for
markets in international trade.
Second, and even more imponderable but I think even more serious, is
the fact that in international trade we are now coming into a situation
where we are faced with the massive communist organization, represented
by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as a competitor and increas-
ingly this great force is entering into international trade with the whole
weight of the state behind it. This state organization is prepared to do
anything to obtain markets for its exports and to eliminate markets for
exports from other countries, particularly the western world with which,
ideologically, the Soviets are in conflict.
They (Canadian industry) have represented to us that if laws are retained
in all their rigidity which certainly raises a very real question about the
legality of the right to organize in export trade, then they are going to
be at an increasing and permanent disadvantage.
The problem, rather, is one of disagreement on the desirability of doing
something to remedy the situation, one of finding some method of amend-
ing our legislation so as to make it clear that what may be done in the
export field may be legitimate but must not be allowed to spill over and
have adverse effects on the domestic economy.
6 Brewster, Antitrust and American Business Abroad, 1958 at p. 354.
7 H. of C. Debates, 1960, Vol. IV, 4340. Mr. Fulton stated that "what we
have presented to the house, are amendments to the combines legislation, not
a general revision," and further ". . . that a general revision would require,
pOSSibly a Royal Commission and at least a study of the principles of the
gislation by a parliamentary committee." The Bill, he stated, "proceeds on
the inherent soundness of the principles of the present anti-combines legis-
lation."
8 H. of C. Debates, 1960, vol. IV, 4341.
9 Ibid., at p. 4345.
1OH. of C., Debates, 1960, vol. VII 6971-2. See also D. H. W. Henry Q.C.
Notes for an address to the International Business Management Course,
Waterloo University, March 1963, at p. 11.
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The result of this discussion has been that we have been able to devise
an amendment which I believe will accomplish the result of making it
clear that arrangements entered into by Canadian industry, having effect
exclusively with relation to their activities in the export markets, may
be exempted from the operation of this act, provided again that they do
not have the indirect result, whether intentional or unintentional, of
producing a disadvantage to Canadian consumers.
Considering the political and economic context alluded to in the
speeches of Mr. Fulton and other members of the House of Commons,
the curious element is the fact that the emphasis for discussion pur-
poses centred around primary industries, namely lumber and fishing.
Yet, one would have thought that more emphasis in the discussion
would have been placed, in general, on secondary industries and, in
particular, on small businessmen as important benefactors of an export
exemption amendment.
In order to appreciate better the operation of the provisions,
they will be looked at in the context of their development. The Minister
of Justice explained that the proposed subsection (4) of the amend-
ment made it clear that in general a charge under this act may be
defended if it relates to activity or arrangements concerned with the
export of articles from Canada.11
Mr. Fulton, in discussing subsection (5) (a) stated:
Since industry says . . that they are concerned in increasing their success
and increasing the volume of Canada's export trade, we think it would
be most unsound for us to leave them an umbrella under which they
might in fact make merely a comfortable arrangement by which they
establish their position based upon present demand for sales in the export
market but do not bother to compete for an increased share in it. The
arrangement must not be allowed to freeze or decrease the volume of
exports from Canada."
Referring to paragraph (b), he stated:
If we do not provide that (i.e. subsection (5) (b)) it might be the case that
unscrupulous persons would be able to make their own arrangements In
the export field, under the protection of sub-clause (4), and then having
worked out a comfortable arrangement say this: We are not going to
have competition; we do not like you so you must stay outside. Then
ultimately they would be able to drive that person out of competition at
least in the export field if not, indeed, in the domestic field.
Referring to paragraph (c), he stated:
The object of the protection (i.e. subsection (4)) is to encourage industry
in export and to enable them to improve their position. Therefore It
must not be allowed to be used by them to prevent somebody else from
getting into this field because that would have the opposite effect to the
purpose for which it was designed.
Referring to paragraph (d) he stated:
It must not be allowed to operate or they must not be able to get protec-
tion under it if in fact the result of their arrangements is to lessen or is
likely to lessen competition unduly in relation to an article in the domestic
market. I think that last paragraph speaks for itself12





The first major point to consider in connection with any proposed
concerted arrangement for export purposes is whether or not such
an arrangement will, in fact, bring about the desired results. Such
desired results may be as follows: a reduction of the average export
sales cost per firm, a resultant broader product base to draw on, a
better ability to supply those foreign buyers who require a continuous
substantial volume of the products or products, a better bargaining
position to compete with or deal with foreign cartels and a possible
expansion of the volume of production of each of the members which
may achieve certain economies of scale, such as the lowering of the
cost of the product or products.
The three general types of export organizations that may be
used are as follows: (1) one in which the association serves as a
central selling agent for all of the members, taking orders, negotiating
sales, and handling shipment of the goods; (2) one in which the
association directs the activities of its members and retains certain
functions in export trade, but the orders are placed by agents already
established by the members abroad (in this case the export depart-
ment of one member may handle foreign orders for several members);
and (3) the export company formed for the purpose of buying the
members' products and reselling them abroad at terms agreed upon
by the members. The first and second methods of selling may be
combined, the members using their established agents for some mar-
kets and the association sales office for new markets or those in
which the trade is not well developed. 14
Assuming at this stage that an export arrangement has been
agreed on it is now time to test it against the Combines Act. To do
so requires an examination of section 32 of the Act.' 5 The prohibition
against combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade is to be
found only in section 32(1). The prohibitions with which export
agreements are mainly concerned are found in the essence of the
offence which is stated, in general, to be combinations that prevent
or lessen unduly competition in the production, purchase, sale, storage,
rental, transportation or supply of commodities. Very broadly speak-
ing, as the courts interpret the Act, whether an agreement to restrict
does so unduly depends on the extent of market control achieved or
sought to be achieved by the agreement and the method of control
of such market. If the arrangement is not in breach of this provision,
then there is no need to look to the remainder of the section for
relief.16
13 D. H. W. Henry Q.C., supra, footnote 10.
14 Brewster, op cit., supra, at p. 112.
For a practical application in Ontario of an export consortium formed by
businessmen in the fruit and vegetable industry and called FAVPEP, reference
D. H. W. Henry's address to the Waterloo Conference, op. cit. supra, at p. 19.
15 For a fuller discussion on this point see D. H. W. Henry, Q.C., supra,
footnote 10.
16 D. H. W. Henry, Q.C., op. cit. supra, at p. 13.
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Subsection (2) of section 32 permits certain defences which in
effect are exemptions from subsection (1). Yet even if the arrange-
ment fell within one of the enumerated exceptions it would be per-
mitted to function only as far as it did not lessen competition unduly
as expressed in subsection (3).
Subsection (4) states that the court shall not convict the accused
if the arrangement relates only to the export of articles from Canada.
It is to be noted that this subsection is in the form of a type of defence
which assumes firstly that the parties are caught by subsection (1),
and secondly that the parties will not be convicted if the agreement
relates only to the export of articles from Canada.
Subsection (5) limits the defence provided in subsection (4) by
stating, in general, that subsection (4) does not apply if the arrange-
ment results or is likely to result in reducing the volume of exports
of an article, injuring the export business of any domestic competitor
not a member of the arrangement, restricting a person from entering
into the export business in Canada or lessening competition unduly
in relation to an article in the domestic market. Thus, it can be seen
that it was Parliament's intention to assist in the increase of exports
from Canada without placing other Canadian exporters at a dis-
advantage or hurting those companies in the domestic market who
are not parties to the combinations.
The questiofi arising at this point is whether or not subsection
(5) places such restrictive qualification on subsection (4) so as to
render it virtually useless. At present there is no case law on the
interpretation of these subsections. On this question D. H. W. Henry
Q.C., the Director of Investigation and Research, has stated:
... as an administrator I am obliged to assume that Parliament intended
some meaning to be given to the amendment, that it intended the section
to be workable and that the limitations on it are not absolute. It is my
own view that a bona fide scheme to encourage exports can be worked
out taking advantage of this provision.' 7
It can only be hoped that the courts will give these export exemp-
tions a meaningful inerpretation by allowing some latitude in the
incidental effect which may occur on the domestic market.'8
Finally, the solicitor, as a practical matter, should advise his
client that the client may discuss the proposed arrangement with
officials of the Combines Branch if he so desires. On the one hand
the client may not wish to reveal his plans and may trust that he
will escape detection under our peculiar enforcement policy. On the
other hand the client may desire to discuss his concerted arrangement
with a view to being informed as to whether or not the combination
37 D. H. W. Henry Q.C. Notes for an address to The Canadian Manufac-
turers' Association, 1964, at p. 13.
3. For a United States decision on this point see United States v. Minne-
sota Mining and Manufacturing Company, 92 F. Supp. 947 (D.C. Mass. Sept.
20, 1950).
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is of such a nature that the Director would have to commence an
inquiry if the arrangement were undertaken.
(d) The United States Webb-Pomerene Act of 191819
The Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act of 1918 was a deliberate
effort to allow exporters to band together to pit their combined power
to countervail the foreign buying cartels.20 The Act provides that
the antitrust laws are not to be construed as declaring to be illegal
"an association entered into for the sole purpose of engaging in export
trade and actually engaged solely in such export trade, or an agree-
ment made or act done in the course of export trade by such associa-
tion, provided that such association, agreement or act is not in
restraint of trade within the United States, and is not in restraint of
the export trade of any domestic competitor of such association."
The Act appears to be parallel in its wording to our section 32, sub-
sections (4) and (5).
Any export combination in the United States seeking the benefits
of the exemption has to file its articles of agreement with the Federal
Trade Commission as well as its annual report on January 1 of each
year. The Commission has authority to investigate the activities of
associations claiming Webb-Pomerene status and to make recommen-
dations for their reform.21 To this extent there is a form of regulatory
authority given by the Act to the Commission. The Commission is
also obliged to report breaches of their recommendations by the
respective combinations to the Department of Justice for possible
prosecution. However the Department of Justice can prosecute under
the antitrust laws without prior investigation and recommendation
by the Commission.2
In Canada the statute gives no regulatory authority in the sense
that it is not provided that a group of businessmen may come to the
Director of Investigation and Research or the Restrictive Trade Prac-
tices Commission and having disclosed its plan receive a permit or
licence or other official sanction for the proposed operations,23 nor is
it necessary to register an export agreement. The Director only moves
when he has reason to believe an offence has been committed or is
about to be committed and, depending upon the circumstances of his
investigation, he can decide whether to take the matter to the Restric-
tive Trade Practices Commission or to the Attorney-General of
Canada.
191918 Webb-Pomerene Act (15 U.S.C. 62, 63, 65).
Note: This sub-heading is included to bring the reader's attention to the
Webb-Pomerene Act-for further discussion of the limited amount of case law
under the Webb-Pomerene Act and criticisms of the Act refer to Brewster,
op. cit. supra, footnote 6.
20 Brewster, op. cit. at p. 24.
21 Ibid. at p. 108.
22 Ibid.
23 D. H. W. Henry, Q.C., op. cit. supra footnote 10 at p. 17.
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The practical result has been that in the United States there have
been very few export combinations formed and only four prosecutions
by the Department of Justice as against comparative inaction in
Canada. The respective Acts do differ somewhat in their formal
requirements and administrative techniques. Still it is submitted that
the reason for the inaction is the fact that, whether there is a regu-
latory authority or not, the bona fide export combinations hesitate
to execute a concerted arrangement since they are constantly vulner-
able from their inception.24
(e) The Effects of the Export Exemption Provisions25
Canada is facing serious competitive disabilities in the world
markets. Because of this fact, if Canada is to become a dynamically
growing industrial nation, Canadian businessmen must turn their
attention to the need for more export-oriented patterns of Canadian
manufacturing production. Coupled with this is the further fact
that Canadian manufacturing industries are relatively small-scale
operations.26 With this situation in mind it would seem logical that
industry, in particular secondary industry, would take advantage of
the export provisions; however, this has not been the case.2 The
question why has this not been the case, is as obvious as the answer
is obscure.
The general starting point, it may be suggested, is the question
of private business control versus government control. Perhaps
private business is not able to compete with foreign state control
(whether it be either direct cartelization, as in the communist
countries, or indirect control, for example, a marketing board, as in
some western countries); consequently the government may have to
step in and fight state control with state control. However, as
Brecher has indicated, most Canadians have thus far chosen to
24 This does not mean necessarily that there should be granted permissive
licences to contravene antitrust laws; but what it does mean is recognition of
the fact that businessmen desire more certainty in this area of the law.
Quaere whether this can be obtained?
25 It has been suggested that the export exemption amendment is rela-
tively new and as such there has not been time for it to register any signifi-
cant effects through its use. Whatever be the reason or reasons for the lack
of effects it makes it difficult to draw conclusions. Rather than attempt con-
clusions it was considered more appropriate to pose for consideration the
various areas wherein difficulties may lie. To obtain material for this end
the author is grateful to the lawyers and businessmen, involved in this field,
who expressed their views when interviewed.26 Arthur J. Smith, Trade Prospects for Canada, Address to the Osgoode
Hall Law School Conference on The European Common Market and the
Canadian Trade and Investment 1963, at p. 5.
27 For example, suppose company X is one of the members of an "Export
Company". Company X has fixed and variable costs to produce 100,000 units
of production. Yet, under that same overhead, it can produce another 30,000
units at an expense of only the actual cash costs. This means a larger pro-
duction run and a lower cost factor; consequently company X can export the
30,000 units at a lower price which it necessarily has to do in order to meet
the foreign cartelized competitors in the world market. Also, assuming com-
pany X is an Ontario manufacturer, it might well be cheaper to ship to
England by boat than it would be to ship to the Canadian west by rail.
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believe that private decision-making in competitive industry is
the superior general technique for promoting consumer welfare.2
Any extension of direct government operation would have to be
justified on solid grounds of public interest. The full measure of
adverse potential in the scheme for government-business collabora-
tion is that, if it did not mean ultimate business control, it would
probably involve an unlimited and arbitrary exercise of government
power. 29 Stated roughly it means that government interference is
like pregnancy-you can't have just a little of it.
But more specifically one might consider finding the difficulties,
which have resulted in a limited use of the export exemption provi-
sions, in one or more of the following three areas--economic, business,
or legal. Mr. Henry suggests "that the major obstacles to schemes
such as this are economic rather than legal and I can only assume
that the apparent lack of activity in this field arises.., from uncer-
tainty as to whether combining for export is indeed an effective
way of penetrating a foreign market where formidable competition
exists."3 0 Added to this overall factor may be a difficulty for small
companies, already hard pressed for capital, to arrange financing
for large export orders.
The difficulties in the business area could be divided into two
parts. The first problem will be termed an "independent competitive
philosophy." This manifests itself in the businessman who guards
his goodwill, trademark, and trade information with great secrecy.
As a result it is most difficult to gather together these independent-
minded competitors into a concerted arrangement particularly, for
example, where they might have to submerge their products beneath
a common label. The second problem is that of export organization
and documentation; this would include familiarity with import and
export permit regulations, customs tariffs and valuation for duty,
marking and labelling requirements, packaging and the "paper" work
involved in documentation. Canadian businessmen may be unable
to cope with these problems whether through ignorance or possible
lack of facilities. What may be needed is a process of re-thinking
in terms of the export markets and not just the domestic market.
The point to note is that if an "Export Company" was formed, by the
members pooling their resources, this export company could collec-
tively handle these problems whereas the individual member could
not.
The difficulties in the legal area are much too wide to be dealt
with in detail for the purposes of this article. By this is meant that
the export exemption provisions as an integral part of the Combines
Act are necessarily affected by the criticisms businessmen and law-
yers levy against the Act in general. This includes the philosophy
behind the Act, the method of its enforcement, the constitutional
28 Brecher, op. cit., supra, footnote 3, at p. 580.
29 -bid., at pp. 580-1.
30 D. H. W. Henry, Q.C., op. cit., supra, footnote 17 at p. 13.
1964] Notes
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
problem, and the idea of discrimination. Businessmen are becoming
increasingly aware of the effect of the Combines Act and are shying
away from any arrangement which might breach its provisions and
place them under investigation where they may be left in limbo for
some time. It follows, therefore, that this condition would keep
them away from the export exemption provisions which are pri-
marily a form of defence. Perhaps the main legal difficulty is a lack
of judicial interpretation of the provisions. Under certain market
conditions an export combination might innocently have a limited
effect on the domestic market.31 If and when the courts look at
problems of this nature, assuming the export combination was formed
bona fide to encourage exports and not as a colourable device to
accomplish an otherwise unlawful purpose, it is to be hoped that the
courts will give meaning to the exemption provisions and allow some
latitude in the incidental effect.
Conclusion
The discussions, under the sub-headings, have been in general
terms for the purpose of communicating an awareness of the overall
circumstances which surround the export exemption provisions. It
is submitted that the economic premises on which the provisions stand
are sound; however, is the law in which they operate sound? If there
is a weakness in the law with regard to the export exemption pro-
visions is it to be found specifically therein or within the whole of
the Combines Act? The limited effect of these provisions, to date,
may possibly indicate an inherent flaw. Although there may be
present weaknesses surrounding the export provisions, they are still
in their infancy and whether they reach maturity will depend on bona
fide use by businessmen, proper guidance by lawyers and intelligent
judicial interpretation by the courts.
ROBERT D. MCINTYRE."
3 lAssume an "Export Company" has sold 25% of its future production
run to Y, a foreign buyer. Suppose through natural causes, for example,
drought in the case of natural products or labour problems in the case of
manufactured products, the optimum output of the "Export Company" Is only
75%. When the seller honours his contract he is going to create a shortage
on the domestic market and depending upon the demand possibly increase
prices. It is this innocent effect on the domestic market that the courts should
look at with some latitude.
*Mr. McIntyre, a graduate of the University of Western Ontario, Is a





OFFENCES IN RELATION TO TRADE
32(1) Every one who conspires, combines, agrees or arranges with another
person
(a) to limit unduly the facilities for transporting, producing, manufac-
turing, supplying, storing or dealing in any article,
(b) to prevent, limit or lessen, unduly, the manufacture or production
of an article, or to enhance unreasonably the price thereof.
(c) to prevent, or lessen, unduly, competition in the production, manu-
facture, purchase, barter, sale, storage, rental, transporation or
supply of an article, or in the price of insurance upon persons or
property, or
(d) to restrain or injure trade or commerce in relation to any article,
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for two
years.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), in a prosecution under subsection (1) the
court shall not convict the accused if the conspiracy, combination, agreement
or arrangement relates only to one or more of the following:
(a) the exchange of statistics,
(b) the defining of product standards,
(c) the exchange of credit information,
(d) definition of trade terms,
(e) co-operation in research and development,
(f) restriction of advertising, or
(g) some other matter not enumerated in subsection (3).
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if the conspiracy, combination, agree-
ment or arrangement has lessened or is likely to lessen competition unduly
in respect of one of the following:
(a) prices,
(b) quantity or quality of production,
(c) markets or customers, or
(d) channels or methods of distribution,
or if the conspiracy, combination, agreement or arrangement has restricted
or is likely to restrict any person from entering into or expanding a business
in a trade or industry.
(4) Subject to subsection (5), in a prosecution under subsection (1) the
court shall not convict the accused if the conspiracy, combination, agreement
or arrangement relates only to the export of articles from Canada.
(5) Subsection (4) does not apply if the conspiracy, combination, agree-
ment or arrangement
(a) has resulted or is likely to result in a reduction or limitation of
the volume of exports of an article;
(b) has restrained or injured or is likely to restrain or injure the export
business of any domestic competitor who is not a party to the con-
spiracy, combination, agreement or arrangement;
(c) has restricted or is likely to restrict any person from entering into
the business of exporting articles from Canada; or
(d) has lessened or is likely to lessen competition unduly in relation
to an article in the domestic market.
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